Where NGOs go and do not go? by Mallick, Debdulal & Nabin, Munirul H.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where NGOs go and do not go? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debdulal Mallick 
Munirul H. Nabin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2011 
 
Research Monograph Series No. 45 
 
 
Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC, 75 Mohakhali, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh  
Telephone: 88-02-9881265, 8824180-7 (PABX) Fax: 88-02-8823542  
Website: www.brac.net/research
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2011 BRAC 
 
May 2011 
 
Cover design 
Sajedur Rahman 
 
Printing and publication 
Altamas Pasha 
 
Design and Layout 
Md. Abdur Razzaque 
 
Published by: 
 
BRAC 
BRAC Centre 
75 Mohakhali 
Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh  
Telephone: (88-02) 9881265, 8824180-87 
Fax: (88-02) 8823542 
Website: www.brac.net/research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRAC/RED publishes research reports, scientific papers, monographs, working 
papers, research compendium in Bangla (Nirjash), proceedings, manuals, and other 
publications on subjects relating to poverty, social development and human rights, 
health and nutrition, education, gender, environment, and governance. 
 
 
Printed by BRAC Printers, 87-88 (old) 41 (new), Block C, Tongi Industrial Area, Gazipur, Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
We would like to thank Aldo Benini, Gautam Bose, Shyamal Chowdhury, Mahabub 
Hossain, Fahad Khalil, Pushkar Maitra, Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Pasquale Sgro, 
Ching-Jen Sun, and the seminar participants at Monash University (Australia) for their 
helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge the Research and Evaluation Division 
of BRAC (Bangladesh) for making the data set available. All errors and omissions are 
the sole responsibility of the authors.  
 
The Research and Evaluation Division (RED) is supported by BRAC's core funds and 
funds from donor agencies, organizations and governments worldwide. Current 
major donors of BRAC and RED include AED ARTS (USA), Aga Khan Foundation 
Canada, AIDA (Spain), AusAID (Australia), Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (USA), 
BRAC-USA, Campaign for Popular Education (Bangladesh), Canadian International 
Development Agency, Department for International Development (UK), DIMAGI 
(USA), EKN (The Netherlands), Emory University (USA), European Commission, 
Family Health International (USA), Fidelis, France, Government of Bangladesh, GTZ 
(Germany), Hospital for Sick Children (Canada), ICDDR,B (Bangladesh), Institute of 
Development Studies (UK), Inter-cooperation Bangladesh, Karolinska University 
(Sweden), Land O Lakes (USA), Manusher Jonno Foundation (Bangladesh), 
Micronutrient Initiative (Canada), NORAD (Norway), OXFAM NOVIB (The 
Netherlands), Oxford University (UK), Plan International Bangladesh, Rockefeller 
Foundation (USA), Rotary International (Bangladesh), Save the Children (UK), Save 
the Children (USA), Scojo Foundation Incorporation (USA), Stanford University (USA), 
Swiss Development Cooperation (Switzerland), The Global Fund (USA), The 
Population Council (USA), UNICEF, University of Leeds (UK), World Bank and World 
Food Programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We aim to investigate the role of output market imperfections in constraining the 
microfinance programme to mitigate credit market imperfections. We develop a 
model in which output market imperfections increase operating costs for non-
government organizations (NGO) and create barriers for producers to market their 
goods. Therefore, NGOs operate in locations having good physical infrastructure and 
better productive and marketing opportunities to minimize operating costs and 
maximize loan repayment. Using data from northern Bangladesh, we found strong 
support for the model predictions. NGO coverage in a village, measured both by 
percentage of NGO member households and number of NGOs working, decreased 
with distance of the village from marketplace and increased with adoption of modern 
irrigation method and soil quality. NGOs did not consider poverty incidence in the 
village. The results have important implications for development economics in 
general and impact assessment of microfinance programme in particular. 
 
Keywords: Microfinance, Location choice, NGO, Market imperfections, Poverty 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the stated objectives of the microfinance programme is poverty alleviation. It 
is, therefore, expected that a non-government organization (NGO)1 will take 
microfinance to the poor and also to the places where profit driven financial 
institutions do not operate due to high operating costs.2 On the other hand, 
sustainability of the microfinance programme without donor support depends on the 
cost-effectiveness as well as on the loan repayments. To achieve the latter objective, 
an NGO will minimize operating costs by placing its program in the adjacent areas or 
in the areas having good physical infrastructure. It will also place the program in the 
areas where there are ample opportunities for investment in productive activities, so 
that the clients of NGOs can generate income to repay their loan. Therefore, an NGO 
faces a trade-off in the selection of programme location,3 and the ultimate choice 
depends on the implied objective that may differ from the stated objective. 
Nevertheless, even accepting this trade-off, the actual motivation of an NGO in 
selecting a programme location is unknown.4  
 
The understanding of choice of programme location by NGOs is important for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, several interlinked markets are simultaneously imperfect in 
developing countries. For example, credit and output markets are directly linked, and 
both are highly imperfect. One of the reasons for output market imperfections is lack 
of good physical infrastructure and marketing facilities that causes the producers to 
incur high transaction costs to search for the buyers. The microfinance programme 
was devised as a response to credit market imperfections in developing countries. If 
choice of programme location by NGOs is influenced by quality of physical 
infrastructure and availability of marketing facilities of the goods produced by their 
clients, then microfinance cannot mitigate credit market imperfections in the 
presence of output market imperfections. This understanding is crucial not only for 
the microfinance programme but also for development economics in general. 
Secondly, poverty alleviation performance of the microfinance programme cannot be 
understood without studying the selection of programme locations, because 
distribution of poverty incidences differs across geographic locations even within a 
small region. Finally, if NGOs actually choose their programme locations purposively 
as opposed to randomly, then research on the impact of the microfinance 
                                                 
1 We do not make any distinction between an NGO and a microfinance institution. 
2 Operating costs consist mainly of personnel and administrative costs, which also depend on physical 
infrastructure; see Gonzalez (2007). 
3 By programme location we refer to a village or a community where an NGO engages in microfinance 
activities (in other words, where its clients or borrowers are located). This is different from the place 
where the NGO itself is located.  
4 Fruttero and Gauri (2005) found that NGOs in Bangladesh initiate new programmes where they had no 
programme previously without considering the community need or the presence of other NGOs. 
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programme, that does not account for the selection bias of programme locations, will 
also be biased.  
 
Our investigation of choice of programme location by NGOs relies on the role of 
output market imperfections in constraining NGOs’ endeavour to microfinance 
programme expansion. We develop a model that we use to guide our empirical 
work. In the model, an NGO is assumed to locate at point 0 on a unit interval [0, 1]. 
The NGO travels to the producers to lend who are uniformly distributed on that unit 
interval.5 In doing so, the NGO incurs operating costs that increase with distance. 
Each producer borrows one unit of capital from the NGO to produce one unit of 
good. The NGO does not purchase goods from the producers. We introduce output 
market imperfections by assuming that the only marketplace on the unit interval is 
located at point 0 (both assumptions of the NGO and the marketplace locating at 
point 0 are justified in next section). Poor physical infrastructure and absence of 
marketing facilities in distant locations make search for buyers costly for the 
produces. They travel to point 0 to meet buyers but in doing so they incur 
transaction (transportation and time) costs which are increasing with distance. 
Therefore, producers located beyond a cut-off distance (a cut-off point on the unit 
line) are not able to sell their goods because of high transaction costs. We show that 
this cut-off distance is negatively related to unit transaction cost (cost of 
transportation and time for travelling one unit of distance) and producers’ unit cost of 
production. 
 
The NGO has a humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation that is attained by 
lending to the poor but it also aims to be financially self-sufficient by minimizing 
operating costs and loan defaults. The humanitarian objective is achieved by lending 
as far as possible on the unit line but this objective is constrained by increasing 
operating costs. We show that the borrowers’ cut-off distance eventually 
compromises the humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation of the NGO because a 
producer located beyond the cut-off distance cannot sell her good and consequently 
cannot repay the NGO loan. The NGO takes into account this cut-off distance in 
selecting the producers for lending because programme sustainability also depends 
on loan repayment from the producers. Therefore, there is another cut-off distance 
for the NGO which also depends on the same factors that determine the producers’ 
cut-off distance such as unit transaction cost and unit production cost. We show 
that the humanitarian objective motivates the NGO to lend beyond the producers’ 
cut-off distance by cross-subsidizing from the profits generated by lending to the 
producers inside the cut-off distance.  
 
Using data for 156 villages in three districts in northern Bangladesh, we test the 
model predictions that NGOs will not lend in distant locations (and with poor physical 
infrastructure) and prefer locations where production costs are low. Our unit of 
analysis is village. The dependent variable is NGO coverage for which the proxies are 
percentage of NGO member households and number of NGOs working in a village. 
Production costs are captured by adoption of modern irrigation method and soil 
                                                 
5 Financial transactions in the microfinance programme usually take place at borrowers’ locations.  
 
 
 
 3 
quality of agricultural land in a village. The empirical results strongly support the 
model predictions. We found that NGO coverage decreased with the distance from 
the main marketplace in rural areas and poor physical infrastructure (such as 
distance from all-weather road). NGO coverage was higher in the villages having 
localized marketing opportunities. Given distance and marketing opportunities, NGO 
coverage increased with adoption of modern irrigation method (and better soil 
quality). We also found that NGOs did not consider poverty incidence in selecting 
programme locations. These results strongly support our prediction that microfinance 
programme is constrained by imperfections in the output market.  
 
There is a growing body of empirical works investigating the “mission drift” (trade-off 
between serving the poor and cost-effectiveness) of the microfinance institutions at 
national or cross-country level (Copestake 2007, Gutiérrez-Nieto, et al. 2007, 
Mersland and Strøm 2010). This paper can also be considered as an effort to study 
the reasons for the “mission drift” using village level survey data. The results have 
important policy implications. Our model and the empirical results show that credit 
market imperfections cannot be mitigated independently without mitigating output 
market imperfections. In this sense, our paper has resemblance with Emran, et al. 
(2007) who have discussed labour market imperfections in understanding some 
important puzzles and debates in the microfinance programme, such as 
unwillingness or inability of the producers (borrowers) to scale up their economic 
activity. NGOs do not invest in infrastructure development but their mission of 
poverty alleviation relies, to a great extent, on the existing infrastructure.6 This justifies 
the need for government intervention.    
 
                                                 
6 One exception can be the mobile phone and internet services provided by Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. However, no NGO invests in developing physical infrastructure such as roads. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Here we provide some background information about NGOs and output market 
imperfections in Bangladesh that will be useful for understanding the model and 
empirical results. Before launching microfinance programme in a particular rural 
region, an NGO first builds, purchases or rents a (large) house at or nearby the 
upazila7 headquarters to set up a branch office (large NGOs such as ASA, BRAC or 
Grameen Bank usually build a house on purchased land, while small NGOs usually 
rent).8 The NGO staff then collect information about possible programme locations 
(villages or communities) in the region where it can engage in lending activities, and 
based on the information (that NGOs do not disclose), they finally select the 
programme locations. Our model and empirics are about the selection of programme 
locations by NGOs. However, we also discuss the reasons for choosing the upazila 
headquarters to set up the NGO branch office and also the strategic interactions 
among NGOs in a given region.9 This discussion will be important for understanding 
the assumptions of our model.  
 
The upazila headquarters is the place of main commercial and financial activities in 
rural Bangladesh. Rural branches of all commercial banks are located at the upazila 
headquarters because of its commercial importance and also because of security 
concerns since the local police station (and all government administrative offices) is 
located in the upazila headquarters. By locating near the upazila headquarters, NGOs 
minimize the cost of regular financial transactions with commercial banks (NGOs 
withdraw money from commercial banks in the morning for loan disbursement and 
deposit the money collected from borrowers in banks in the afternoon) and also 
ensure security.10 
 
A typical NGO initially chooses one or two particular upazilas in a district to start 
microfinance programme and gradually expands. In each upazila, the NGO chooses 
several villages or communities for lending to the poor. This is the standard practice 
of all NGOs in Bangladesh. NGOs do not disclose information about how they 
choose a upazila or the villages in a upazila. A general observation is that two NGOs 
do not start operations in the same village simultaneously, rather they move 
                                                 
7 Upazila is the lowest administrative unit in Bangladesh. A district consists of several upazilas, an upazila 
consists of several Union Parishads (councils), and a Union Parishad (lowest local government unit) 
consists of many villages.  
8 The NGO head office is located at the capital or large city and is not involved in transactions with the 
clients/borrowers. These transactions are conducted from the branch offices located at the upazila 
headquarters, and the head office monitors the performance of the branch offices.  
9 NGOs do not disclose information on location choice and strategic interactions. The discussion in this 
section is based on anecdotal evidence and the authors’ discussions with NGO staff.  
10 In the model presented in next section, the upazila headquarters is point 0 on the unit interval where 
both the NGO and the market are located.  
 
 
 
 5 
sequentially. There is no cooperation among NGOs, explicit or implicit, on the 
selection of villages or communities. It is now common that several NGOs lend in the 
same village although they did not enter simultaneously. However, there is an 
unofficial agreement on information sharing that an NGO will not lend to someone 
who has already been a client of another NGO, but in practice no NGO follows this 
implicit rule. 
 
The microfinance programme emerged in Bangladesh (and also in other developing 
countries) as a response to credit market imperfections. However, output market is 
also highly imperfect, especially in rural areas, due to lack of physical infrastructure 
and marketing opportunities. Physical infrastructure (such as all-weather road) is 
usually well developed only in and around the upazila headquarters. But such 
infrastructure is of poor quality or even absent altogether at locations away from the 
upazila headquarters. Marketing opportunities are also limited or absent in remote 
areas. The rural producers usually travel to the upazila headquarters to sell their 
goods. In many instances, transporting goods to the upazila headquarters is 
prohibitively costly for small individual producers. Sometimes beparees (large 
middlemen who are also located at the upazila headquarters or at the town) travel to 
villages to buy goods from producers and then sell at the upazila headquarters or at 
the nearest town. Small producers in remote areas receive lower price (adjusting for 
transportation costs) from beparees than that they would receive if they could 
transport to the upazila headquarters.11 There are some haats (small village market or 
bazaar that takes place for few hours once or twice a week) where small producers 
bring their goods to sell. The beparees sometimes visit haats and purchase goods in 
bulk from small producers, thus depriving the local buyers who then need to travel to 
the upazila headquarters to purchase. It is important to mention that NGOs in 
Bangladesh do not engage in marketing the goods produced by their clients.  
 
                                                 
11 Aminuzzaman et al. (2003) document that mobile phone expansion in rural Bangladesh has lowered the 
price gap between rural and urban areas because the rural producers are now better informed about 
the market price, so that middlemen pay higher price than before. 
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THE MODEL 
 
This section develops a simple model of how an NGO chooses a programme 
location to lend to the potential producers.  
 
Model environment 
 
The model consists of a set of producers, buyers, and an NGO. The NGO is located 
at point 0 on a unit interval [0, 1]. It takes microfinance to the producers who are 
uniformly distributed on that unit interval. An individual producer j is located at 
distance dj from point 0. The NGO incurs operating costs to reach the producers that 
increase with distance. Each producer borrows one unit of capital from the NGO to 
produce one unit of good. We assume that there exists a single marketplace on the 
unit interval and it is also located at point 0 (the upazila headquarters). The reason for 
this assumption is that marketing opportunities in remote areas are limited or even 
non-existent because of underdeveloped physical infrastructure. The NGO does not 
purchase goods from the producers, nor do the producers consume their goods. An 
individual producer needs to travel to point 0 to sell her goods and incurs transaction 
(transportation and time) costs, which is increasing with distance. Therefore, 
transaction costs for searching buyers is high for the producer as one move away 
from point 0. This leads to output market imperfection. 
 
Buyer  
 
An individual buyer i has the willingness to pay iv .12 We assume that iv  is uniformly 
distributed over [0, 1] interval. Let p be the price paid by the buyers, where 1p ≤ . 
The total demand for the good ( dQ ) will be those buyers whose willingness to pay is 
higher than or equal to p:  
 
{ }
0
Pr : 1 ( ) 1
p
d
iQ v v p dF v p= ≥ = − = −∫ ...........(1) 
                                                 
12 The willingness to pay can be expressed as i iv dθ τ= − , where θ  is the utility from consuming one 
unit of the good which is the same for all consumers and τ is the unit transaction cost. iv decreases 
with distance of the consumer from the market because of transaction costs. However, our 
simplification does not change the demand curve in equation (1).  
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Producer 
 
Each producer combines her labour with one unit of capital borrowed at zero interest 
rate from the NGO13 to produce one unit of a homogenous good. The unit cost of 
production, (0,  1]c∈ , is assumed to be the same for all producers. The producers 
travel to point 0 to search for the buyers. We assume that a producer located at 
distance d has the unit transaction cost ( )dτ (cost of transportation and time for 
travelling one unit of distance) that is an increasing function of d, i.e., ( ) 0dτ ′ > . The 
reason is that as one moves away from point 0, quality of infrastructure gets worse, 
which increases unit transaction cost. A producer located at point d can sell her 
good at point 0 only if the sum of her unit production cost and total transaction cost 
is less than or equal to the market price, 
  
( )c d d pτ+ ≤ ...................................................(2) 
 
For simplicity, we assume that ( )d dτ τ=  where [0,  1]τ ∈ , i.e., unit transaction cost 
increases proportionately with distance. Note that ( ) 0dτ τ′ = >  can also be 
interpreted as the quality of physical infrastructure (such as existence and quality of 
paved or all-weather road), which deteriorates as one moves along the unit line. 
Therefore, higher τ implies poor physical infrastructure that induces higher 
transaction costs. Using equation (1), equation (2) can be rewritten as follows, 
 
2 1c d dτ+ ≤ −  ....................................(3) 
 
Solution of equation (3) gives the following expression for d that determines a cut-off 
distance beyond which producers will not be able to travel to point 0 to sell their 
goods (or the remotest producer who can travel to point 0): 
  ( )* 1 4 (1 ) 1 / 2fd cτ τ= + − − ...............................(4) 
 
For feasibility, we need *0 1fd≤ ≤ , which requires 1c ≤ . It can be shown from 
equation (4) that the producers’ cut-off distance is decreasing with both unit 
transaction cost (quality of infrastructure), τ , and unit production cost, c. If 0τ → , 
* 1fd →  for a value of c = 0. 14 The equilibrium price will be  
 ( )* 1 1 4 (1 ) 1 / 2fp cτ τ= − + − − ........................(5) 
                                                 
13 A typical NGO in Bangladesh charges the same interest rate to all borrowers, so interest rate can be 
normalized to zero.  
 
14 If we instead assume that ( )dτ τ= , that is constant unit transaction cost at all points on the unit 
interval, the cut-off distance becomes 
* (1 ) /(1 )fd c τ= − + . The result that *fd is decreasing with 
both c and τ , does not change. The same limit also holds.  
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Choice of programme location by NGOs 
 
An NGO faces a trade-off in the maximization of its objective function. It aims to 
alleviate poverty and therefore would like to lend to all producers on the unit interval. 
On the other hand, covering distant areas constrains its programme sustainability 
(cost-effectiveness) by increasing operating costs.15 There are two types of operating 
costs for an NGO. The first is transportation costs to reach the borrowers that 
depend on distance and physical infrastructure such as all-weather road. The 
second is staff salary and office maintenance costs.16 An NGO is also concerned 
about loan repayment for its programme sustainability; hence it prefers to lend in 
locations where producers can generate income to repay the loan. The role of the 
producers’ cut-off distance comes into play here. Producers locating beyond *fd will 
be unable to sell their goods and, as a consequence, they will be unable to repay the 
loan. Keeping this in mind, the NGO’s objective function is written as follows:  
 
max
d
L(d) = φ(d) − β(d)−ϕ(d f* ,d) .................(6) 
 
where ( )dφ  is the coverage (number of producers) that increases with distance d, 
β(d )  is the operating costs that also increase with d, and *( , )fd dϕ is the distance 
relative to the producers’ cut-off distance. For simplicity, we assume, i) ( )d dφ = , ii) 
operating costs are convex, i.e., β(d) = 1
2
d 2 , and iii) *
2* *( , )
f
f fd d
d d I d dϕ > ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ , 
where *
fd d
I > is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if 
*
fd d> , and 0 
otherwise. The last expression captures the loss from loan default. An NGO can 
attain its humanitarian objective by lending beyond *fd , but the producers located 
beyond *fd will not be able repay loan as they cannot sell their goods. With the above 
assumptions, the NGO’s objective function is rewritten as:  
 
*
22 *1max ( )
2 f fd dd
L d d d I d d> ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ ..............(7) 
 
The first-order condition yields the following cut-off distance of the NGO: 
 
* *(1 2 ) / 3N fd d= + ...............................................(8) 
                                                 
15 Gonzalez (2007) defines operating costs in terms of personnel and administrative costs. He documents 
that operating costs of microfinance institutions increase with poor physical infrastructure such as 
absence of paved or all-weather roads. 
 
16 Higher number of staff will be required (or more time will be spent by each staff) to work in remote areas. 
If information asymmetry is introduced in the model, this corresponds to higher cost of information 
collection about the producers in remote areas.  
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Equation (8) yields the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: An NGO will expand its microfinance programme up to a critical (cut-
off) distance ( *Nd ), which is positively related to the producers’ cut-off 
distance ( *fd ).  
 
Proof: The proof follows from equation (8).  
 
Equation (8) sets out the important role of the producers’ cut-off distance in forcing 
the NGO to behave strategically in choosing its coverage distance. It implies that the 
NGO’s cut-off distance decreases if both unit transaction cost and unit production 
cost increase. 
 
Poor infrastructure and associated transaction costs cause imperfections in the 
output market. When imperfections disappear, i.e., * 1fd → , * 1Nd →  implying that all 
producers are now served by the NGO.17 It can also be shown that * *N fd d> except 
at the point where 1d = , which suggests that the NGO will lend beyond the 
producers’ cut-off distance. Although for any *fd d> , the NGO incurs loss because 
of loan default, it will cross-subsidize from the profit generated at * *N fd d≤ . This is 
because of its humanitarian objectives.18 Aubert et al. (2009) discuss the case of 
higher expected repayment rate with less-poor borrowers to cross-subsidize loans to 
poor borrowers. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) model the behaviour of non-profit 
lenders, and show that their non-standard, client-maximizing objectives cause them 
to cross-subsidize within their pool of borrowers. We have a similar result if we 
interpret the producers’ distribution in terms of poverty incidence instead of distance.  
 
Multiple NGOs 
 
In this section, we allow the presence of more than one NGO. We assume that 
NGOs enter the space sequentially (based on earlier discussion) and do not have 
                                                 
17 If the NGO has only the humanitarian motive, the objective function becomes 
21max
2d
W d d= − , 
and the cut-off distance is 
* 1sd = . The NGO will cover the entire distance. 
 
18 Cross-subsidization can also be due to information asymmetry in the credit market, which is absent in 
our model. Costs of obtaining information about the producers increase with distance, therefore some 
bad producers (borrowers) will also borrow from the NGO and default.  It is important to mention that 
although loan repayment is very high for most NGOs, it is always less than 100%. Microfinance 
program can still be profitable for an NGO even after certain percentage of loan delinquency, which can 
be shown by substituting the value of 
*
Nd  in the objective function of the NGO in equation (7) that gives 
* *1 / 6 (1 / 3) (2 ) 0f fd d+ − > .  
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capacity constraint. We also assume that a producer cannot borrow from more than 
one NGO (given that producers are poor NGO borrowers, they cannot utilize larger 
amount of capital),19 thus ruling out membership overlapping. Therefore, only one 
NGO can serve at each point on the unit interval. Finally, NGOs do not engage in a 
strategic game. An NGO, when it decides to launch a microfinance programme, 
chooses from the remaining distance uncovered by previous NGOs to maximize its 
objective function subject to its own operating costs and the producers’ cut-off 
distance. For example, the second entrant takes the distance *Nd  covered by the 
first NGO as given and maximizes its objective function by choosing its optimal 
distance from the *(1 )Nd− space. The incumbent, the first NGO, was not concerned 
about potential entrants when it chose its optimal distance *Nd  in the first instance.  
The objective function of the second NGO is therefore given by:  
 
*
22
22 * 2 *
1 2 2 2
1max ( ) [1 ]
2 f fd dd
L d d d d I d d> ⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦ , .......................(9) 
 
where * *1 Nd d=  in equation (8). The first-order condition combined with equation (8) 
yields the cut-off distance of the second NGO: 
 
* *
2 (2 / 3) Nd d=  ...................................................(10) 
 
Equation (10) shows that the second NGO always covers a shorter distance than its 
predecessor. The third potential entrant chooses its optimal distance by maximizing 
*
3
2* * 2 *
1 2 3 3 3
1[1 ]
2 f fd d
d d d d I d d> ⎡ ⎤− − − − −⎣ ⎦ , which is given by * 2 *3 (2 / 3) Nd d= . Solving 
recursively, the cut-off distance of the nth NGO is derived as * 1 *(2 / 3)nn Nd d
−= . The 
total distance covered by all n NGOs is the sum of the distances covered by each 
NGO: * *3 1 (2 / 3)nNd d ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ . Note that *d is proportional to the cut-off distance in 
the case of a single NGO ( *Nd ) implying that 
*d  is also negatively related to c and τ.  
 
Using the value of * *(1 2 ) / 3N fd d= +  and that * 1d ≤ , the optimal number of NGOs 
is derived as:  
 
* * *ln[2 /(1 2 )]/ ln(2 / 3)f fn d d n≥ + = ..................(11) 
Proposition 2: * [0,1]fd∀ ∈ , *n is decreasing with *fd .  
.  
Proof: The proof follows from equation (11).  
                                                 
19 Emran, et al. (2007) also discuss that borrowers (producers) are not willing to borrow larger amounts 
because of labour market imperfections.  
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Proposition 2 is intuitive. The distance covered by an NGO increases with 
*
fd because more producers can sell their goods at point 0 and thus repay loans. 
The incumbent NGO will, therefore, cover a longer distance leaving less space for 
potential new entrants. It is clear from equation (11) that n = 1 when * 1fd = . It 
implies that as imperfections in the output market disappear ( * 1fd → ), the role of 
NGOs in mitigating credit market imperfections becomes less important.  
 
Figure 1 displays the relationship between *fd (for a range of values between 0.01 
and 1) and the optimal number of NGOs. The number of NGOs decreases 
monotonically with *fd . For the smallest and largest values of 
*
fd in our 
parameterization, the maximum and minimum number of NGOs is nine and one, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 1. Optimal number of NGOs and the producers’ cut-off distance  
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TAKING THE MODEL TO DATA 
 
Our testable predictions are summarized in Proposition 1, which implies that NGO 
coverage decreases if both unit transaction cost (inversely related to distance and 
infrastructure quality) and producers’ (borrowers’)20 unit production cost increase. 
Our unit of analysis is village, so we investigate the determinants of NGO coverage in 
a village. 
  
Our first prediction is that NGO coverage in a village is negatively associated with 
distance from NGO (and also infrastructure quality in and around the village). Given 
that NGOs are invariably located at or nearby the upazila headquarters, where 
commercial banks are also located (discussed earlier), our proxies for distance of a 
village from NGO are distances from the upazila headquarters and from the nearest 
commercial bank, respectively. Our second prediction is that NGO coverage is 
positively (negatively) associated with lower (higher) unit production cost. Unit 
production cost will be low in a village with better opportunities for productive 
activities, such as modern irrigation facilities or better soil quality of agricultural land. 
We investigated whether percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity and 
percentage of agricultural land growing multiple crops in a year increase NGO 
coverage in a village. It is important to mention that good infrastructure also lowers 
production cost because of better access to production inputs.  
 
We measured NGO coverage by percentage of households in a village who are NGO 
members. There is a significant positive association between percentage of NGO 
member households and number of NGOs working in a village.21 We thus considered 
the number of NGOs as an alternative measure of NGO coverage. Then the testable 
predictions are that the number of NGOs working in a village decreases with 
distance from the upazila headquarters and increases with better opportunities for 
productive activities. Note that this does not contradict the model results in the case 
of multiple NGOs. The model predicts that as *fd increases, there will be fewer NGOs 
in the [0, 1] space. The model is not about the number of NGOs at a particular point 
on the space, which is assumed to be only one.  
 
Data  
 
Village level information was collected in 2002 from 156 villages in 15 upazilas in 
three districts (Kurigram, Rangpur and Nilphamari) in northern Bangladesh as part of 
a baseline household survey. Both participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and focus 
                                                 
20 In our model producers borrow from NGO to produce goods. Therefore, in the empirical section we also 
refer to producers as borrowers to be consistent with the data. 
 
21 In our data, the regression of the percentage of NGO member households on the number of NGOs 
produces a coefficient of 0.04 with a robust standard error of 0.009. 
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group discussion (FGD) were conducted in the villages selected randomly. The 
information collected includes, among others, physical infrastructure, economic 
opportunities, marketing facilities, educational and health infrastructure, microfinance 
and other development activities, and poverty incidence. A structured questionnaire 
was used because of the type of information sought and also because of reliability 
and possibility of replication. The PRA sessions were attended by people of all walks 
of life, while the people most knowledgeable about the village attended the FGDs. 
The group of attendants in the FGDs generally included school teachers, elected 
Union Parishad members, health workers, students, and clients of different NGOs.22  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of the villages are presented in Table 1. On average 3.9 NGOs 
operate in a village with the minimum and maximum number being one and nine, 
respectively. Although there are a total of 48 NGOs and 10 government organizations 
working in all sample villages (Appendix A.1), microfinance activities are largely 
dominated by few large (brand) NGOs. This is evident from the fact that the average 
number of large NGOs in a village is 3.4 with the minimum and maximum number 
being one and seven, respectively. All seven large NGOs are engaged in 
microfinance activities. The presence of several large NGOs in a village supports the 
findings of Fruttero and Gauri (2005) that an NGO does not consider presence of 
other NGOs in choosing programme location. On the other hand, average number of 
small (non-brand) NGOs working in a village is only 0.4. There are on average 549 
households in a village, and 33% of them borrow from any NGO. Only about 11% of 
the households in a village have access to electricity, and 27% of the agricultural land 
in a village is irrigated using electricity. About 81% of agricultural land grows two to 
three crops a year, while 13% of land grows a single crop a year. 
 
Average distance of the centre of a village from the upazila headquarters is about 7.5 
km. Average distance from the nearest commercial bank is about 6.5 km. Therefore, 
it can also be inferred that average radius of operational area of an NGO ranges 
between 6.5 to 7.5 km.23 The correlation between the two distances is high at 
around 0.76. 
 
                                                 
22 At the beginning of the session, the objective of the FGD and the type of information to be sought were 
clearly specified. It was also made clear at the outset that the FGD will continue for about two hours. 
However, in several occasions, all issues were not possible to cover in two hours so that discussions 
had to discontinue. Groups were not kept beyond schedule because it was perceived that impatience 
of the participants may lead to inaccurate answers. Therefore, all information could not be collected 
from many villages. 
   
23 This cut-off radius can also be generalized for the rest of Bangladesh. In 2010, BRAC has launched a 
new lending programme for the share-croppers (Borga Chashi programme) funded by the Bangladesh 
Bank (the central bank in Bangladesh). The programme initially covers 40 districts across the country. 
The implicit cut-off radius set by BRAC is 8 km from the BRAC branch offices (which are located nearby 
the upazila headquarters). However, BRAC does not officially make available the information about this 
cut-off radius. 
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Distance as a measure of poverty incidence 
 
We also want to test the poverty alleviation motive of NGOs. However, NGO 
intervention changes the poverty dynamics in a village, thus inclusion of direct 
measure of poverty incidence or proxies, such as wage rate or landlessness, in the 
regression will lead to simultaneity bias. We need a measure for poverty incidence 
that is immune to this bias. In the following, we show that distance can be treated as 
such a measure because poverty incidence increases with distance; in other words, 
poverty incidence is higher in the remote villages. We show that two proxies for 
poverty incidence - daily wage rate and percentage of landless households in a 
village - are strongly related to distance. Both lower wage rate and higher 
landlessness are indications of higher poverty incidence. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Variables Notation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of NGOs working in a village  3.890  
[min = 1, max = 9] 
1.412 
Number of large NGOs working in a village  3.445  
[min = 1, max = 7] 
1.244 
Number of small NGOs working in a village  0.445  
[min = 0, max = 3] 
0.685 
% of NGO member households in the village  0.332  
Number of households in a village HHNV 549.32  418.73 
% of land irrigated using electricity  IRRIG 0.268  
% of land growing 1 crop a year CROP_1 0.126  
% of land growing 2 crops a year  CROP_2 0.492  
% of land growing 3 crops a year  CROP_3 0.317  
% of land growing 4 crops a year  CROP_4 0.036  
% of HHs owning less than 10 decimal of land LNDLES 0.063  
Number of shops per household SHOP 0.053 0.087 
% of households with electricity  ELECT 0.111  
Distance from upazila (in km)  DTHAN 7.541 4.057 
Distance from nearest bank (in km)  DBANK 6.503 4.134 
Distance from nearest haat (bazaar) (in km)  DBAZR 1.993 1.689 
Distance from nearest bus stop (in km)  DBUST 5.550 4.543 
Distance from nearest all-weather road (in km)  DROAD 1.803 1.691 
Distance from nearest high school (in km)  DHSCH 2.187 1.619 
Average male wage rate (in Taka)  MWAGE 43.916 8.362 
Average female wage rate (in Taka)  FWAGE 29.695 7.022 
 
Wage rate fluctuates depending on the availability of employment opportunities in 
different seasons. To account for seasonal fluctuations, we take average of daily 
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wage rate for each month over twelve months. Data indicate that there is a strong 
negative and statistically significant correlation between average daily female wage 
rate and distance from the upazila headquarters. Figure 2a superimposes a lowess fit 
line representing the best nonparametric fit of the relationship between female wage 
and distance from the upazila headquarters. The fitted line indicates that female 
wage decreases sharply with distance up to 4 km after which it remains stable up to 
nearly 10 km and then decreases again. The estimated linear regression coefficient is 
-0.306 with a robust standard error of 0.153, which is shown in Figure 2b by the 
downward sloping fitted line. Figures 3a and 3b show the lowess and linear 
regression fits, respectively, for average daily male wage rate, which is very similar to 
female wage rate.   
 
Figure 2. Correlation between average daily female wage rate and distance 
from the upazila headquarters   
[ 
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with a robust standard error of 0.153. 
 
Figure 3. Correlation between average daily male wage rate and distance 
from the upazila headquarters  
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Figure 4. Correlation between percentage landless households and distance 
from the upazila headquarters  
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Figure 4b 
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robust standard error of 0.095. 
 
In Figure 4a, we display the lowess fit for the correlation between percentage of 
households in a village who are landless (or own only homestead) and distance from 
the upazila headquarters.24 Percentage of landless households increases sharply with 
distance up to 5 km, remains stable and then increases steadily after 10 km. Figure 
4b plots the linear regression fit which is upward sloping; the regression coefficient of 
distance from the upazila headquarter on percentage of landless households is 0.183 
with a robust standard error of 0.095. These results indicate that the distribution of 
borrowers in terms of distance can also be interpreted as their distribution in terms of 
poverty incidence, and therefore, distance can be treated as an exogenous measure 
of poverty incidence.  
 
Estimation strategy  
 
We estimate OLS regressions when NGO coverage is measured by percentage of 
households in a village with current NGO membership. We estimate Poisson 
regressions when number of NGOs working in a village is considered as NGO 
coverage.  For robustness checks, we also estimate Poisson regressions for number 
of large and small NGOs working in a village, respectively. Finally, NGO density, 
calculated as number of NGOs per household, is also employed as the dependent 
variable.  
 
If NGOs are motivated by cost-effectiveness and higher loan repayment rather than 
poverty alleviation, it is expected that NGO coverage will decrease with distance of 
the village from NGO for which our proxies are the distances from the upazila 
                                                 
24 There are some villages where landlessness suddenly and sharply increased because of river bank 
erosion. River erosion causes land permanently disappearing under the river and the victim families lose 
their home and agricultural land forever. This is a regular phenomenon in Bangladesh. We have 
excluded those villages to draw the fits.    
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headquarters and the nearest commercial bank. It is also expected that an NGO will 
not cover a village because of high operating costs if physical infrastructure in and 
around the village is not developed. Distance of the village from all-weather road and 
bus stop are included to account for the quality of physical infrastructure. 
Conversely, if NGOs are motivated by poverty alleviation, NGO coverage will increase 
with (or unrelated to) distance from the upazila headquarters (and commercial bank) 
and in the villages with poor infrastructure. Therefore, the sign and significance of the 
distance variables will determine the actual motivation of NGOs. A negative and 
statistically significant coefficient will support the cost-effectiveness motive, while a 
positive and significant coefficient (or insignificant coefficient) will support the poverty 
alleviation motive.  
 
As mentioned earlier, unit cost of production is captured by opportunities for 
productive activities, such as percentage of agricultural land irrigated using 
electricity,25 and percentage of agricultural land that grows one, two and three crops 
a year (four crops is the base category). The higher the productive opportunity in a 
village, the higher is the likelihood of success in investment projects. More NGOs will 
place programmes therein and also cover more borrowers to take advantage of 
higher loan repayment. Number of shops per household in the village26 and distance 
from the local haat (bazaar) are included to control for localized marketing 
opportunities in the village. Percentage of households with electricity connection also 
captures infrastructure. 
 
We check the robustness of the results by including a vibrancy score constructed by 
the principal component analysis from distances of the village from upazila, bank, all-
weather road, haat, and bus stop. We also control for the general education level in 
the village by distance from the nearest high school. It is important to mention that 
the village level infrastructure accounts for the village level unobservables. These are 
slowly changing village characteristics, and therefore, can also be considered as the 
village level fixed effects.27 District dummies (two dummies for the three sample 
districts) are also included to capture the regional heterogeneity. Number of 
households is included in the regression to account for village size when the 
dependent variable is number of NGOs working a village.  
 
In a nutshell, the dependent variable is related to credit market and the independent 
variables are related to output market. This specification helps us investigate the 
effect of output market imperfections on credit market imperfections.  
                                                 
25 In northern Bangladesh, irrigation is usually done by extracting underground water by deep tubewell that 
runs using electricity. Installation of such deep tubewell is very costly that only large landowners can 
afford. Small and marginal farmers purchase water from large landowners. Purchase of water by small 
and marginal farmers is not usually made from NGO loans. NGOs do not provide fund for seasonal or 
working capital so that borrowers resort to alternative informal sources including the moneylenders for 
such additional fund (Jain and Mansuri 2003, Mallick 2009). In Bangladesh, electricity connection is 
provided by the government. NGOs are not involved in any stage. Therefore, percentage land irrigated 
using electricity is an exogenous variable. 
 
26 NGOs in Bangladesh do not usually lend for starting up a shop but lend the shop owners for expanding 
their existing business. Therefore, number of shops in a village is exogenous.  
27 Distance of the village from mobile phone mast (tower) may be another fixed effect. However, we use 
the data for 2002 and mobile phone masts were limited only in the upazila headquarters in 2002. 
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RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports the regression results when the dependent variable is percentage of 
NGO member households in a village. In column 1, distance of the village from the 
upazila headquarters is the proxy for distance from NGO, and in column 2, distance 
from the nearest commercial bank is the proxy. Although none of them is significant, 
in both columns, distances from all-weather road and from local haat are negative 
and significant. The former result suggests lower NGO coverage in the village with 
poor infrastructure, while the latter suggests higher NGO coverage in the village 
having localized marketing opportunities. In column 3, all distance variables are 
replaced by a vibrancy score constructed by the principal component analysis. High 
score implies poor physical infrastructure. The coefficient is negative but not 
significant. The only other variable that is robustly significant (and is positive) across 
specifications is percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity.  
 
Table 2. OLS regression - dependent variable: percentage of NGO member 
households in a village  
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
IRRIG 0.148** (2.34) 0.151** (2.43) 0.114* (1.81) 
CROP_1 0.138 (0.77) 0.153 (0.83) 0.037 (0.20) 
CROP_2 -0.126 (-1.07) -0.112 (-0.91) -0.156 (-1.37) 
CROP_3 -0.195 (-1.57) -0.168 (-1.31) -0.223* (-1.81) 
SHOP -0.119 (-0.91) -0.121 (-0.92) -0.022 (-0.17) 
ELECT -0.116 (-0.60) -0.133 (-0.69) 0.035 (0.19) 
DTHAN -0.005 (-0.97)   
DBANK  -0.002 (-0.35)  
DBAZR -0.023* (-1.68) -0.026* (-1.89)  
DBUST 0.009 (1.42) 0.008 (1.12)  
DROAD -0.036*** (-3.37) -0.035*** (-3.26)  
VIBR†   -0.026 (-1.44) 
DHSCH 0.027 (1.61) 0.028* (1.68) 0.002 (0.15) 
R-square 0.254 0.247 0.143 
Sample size 111 111 110 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant 
and two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
† Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-
weather road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and upazil headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
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The results are similar (and also improve) for the alternative dependent variable - 
number of NGOs working in the village (Table 3). The main changes in the results are 
that instead of distances from all-weather road and haat, distances from the upazila 
headquarters and the nearest commercial bank are negative and significant (at 1% 
level) in columns 1 and 2, respectively, and their magnitudes are the same at around 
0.04. The coefficient of vibrancy is now negative and significant at 1% level. Number 
of NGOs also increases with number of shops per household in the village again 
suggesting higher NGO coverage in the village with localized marketing 
opportunities.  
 
Table 3. Poisson regression - dependent variable: number of NGOs in 
a village  
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
IRRIG 0.143* (1.95) 0.217*** (3.01) 0.193*** (2.66) 
CROP_1 -0.291 (-0.98) -0.211 (-0.71) -0.221 (-0.72) 
CROP_2 -0.091 (-0.33) -0.132 (-0.47) -0.115 (-0.40) 
CROP_3 0.039 (-0.13) -0.077 (-0.25) -0.026 (-0.08) 
SHOP 0.966*** (4.05) 0.676** (2.24) 0.700*** (2.72) 
ELECT 0.006 (0.05) -0.016 (-0.11) -0.061 (-0.45) 
DTHAN -0.038*** (-5.16)   
DBANK  -0.035*** (-4.42)  
DBAZR 0.018 (0.96)    0.010 (0.52)  
DBUST 0.005 (0.92) 0.006 (1.13)  
DROAD -0.024 (-1.34) -0.017 (-0.95)  
VIBR†   -0.094*** (-4.44) 
DHSCH -0.021 (-0.89) -0.010 (-0.41) -0.004 (-0.20) 
HHNV -0.000 (-0.43) 0.000 (0.14) -0.000 (-0.19) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -237.144 -235.966 -236.291 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant 
and two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
† Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-
weather road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and upazila headquarters. Higher score implies poor 
infrastructure.  
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When the number of large NGOs is employed as the dependent variable, the results, 
presented in Table 4, are similar to that when the dependent variable is total number 
of NGOs. The results do not also change qualitatively when the number of small 
NGOs is the dependent variable (Table 5). Percentage of agricultural land irrigated 
using electricity now becomes insignificant. Instead, percentage of agricultural land 
growing single crop a year, which is another proxy for productive opportunities, is 
negative and robustly significant at 1% level, suggesting that NGO coverage 
decreases in the villages with less fertile agricultural land. Percentage of agricultural 
land that grows three crops a year is also negative and weakly significant but its 
magnitude is five times smaller than that of percentage of land that grows single crop 
a year (the base category is percentage of agricultural land that grows four crops a 
year). Number of shops per household is insignificant.  
 
Table 4. Poisson regression - dependent variable: number of large NGOs in 
a village  
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
IRRIG 0.220*** (2.74) 0.281*** (3.53) 0.262*** (3.30) 
CROP_1 0.201 (0.95) 0.273 (1.26) 0.272 (1.23) 
CROP_2 0.008 (0.05) -0.032 (-0.18) 0.015 (0.08) 
CROP_3 0.119 (0.61) 0.088 (0.42) 0.131 (0.62) 
SHOP 0.997*** (5.16) 0.785*** (4.01) 0.753*** (4.42) 
ELECT -0.049 (-0.36) -0.070 (-0.51) -0.112 (-0.80) 
DTHAN -0.027*** (-3.86)   
DBANK  -0.022*** (-2.82)  
DBAZR 0.030* (1.59) 0.025 (1.39)  
DBUST -0.001 (-0.15) -0.001 (-0.16)  
DROAD -0.016 (-0.96) -0.013 (-0.79)  
VIBR†   -0.069*** (-3.53) 
DHSCH -0.031 (-1.29) -0.023 (-0.97) -0.007 (-0.35) 
HHNV 0.000 (0.30)    0.000 (0.73) 0.000 (0.58) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -225.839 -224.673 -224.866 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant 
and two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
† Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-
weather road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and upazila headquarters. Higher score implies poor 
infrastructure.  
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Table 5. Poisson regression - dependent variable: number of small NGOs 
in a village  
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
IRRIG -0.093 (-0.26) 0.033 (0.09) -0.174 (-0.49) 
CROP_1 -5.451*** (-3.66) -5.217*** (-3.49) -5.578*** (-3.60) 
CROP_2 -0.878 (-1.28) -0.918 (-1.30) -0.982 (-1.33) 
CROP_3 -1.202* (-1.65) -1.266* (-1.65) -1.107 (-1.47) 
SHOP 0.236 (0.14) -0.193 (-0.10) 0.553 (0.35) 
ELECT 0.261 (0.33) 0.299 (0.35) 0.239 (0.31) 
DTHAN -0.113*** (-2.86)   
DBANK  -0.129*** (-3.24)  
DBAZR -0.118 (-1.14) -0.149 (-1.42)  
DBUST 0.039 (1.25) 0.040 (1.34)  
DROAD -0.074 (-0.78) -0.031 (-0.32)  
VIBR†   -0.315*** (-3.11) 
DHSCH 0.084 (0.88) 0.120 (1.32) 0.050 (0.58) 
HHNV -0.001 (-1.41) -0.000 (-1.09) -0.001 (-1.57) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -99.239 -97.984 -100.274 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant 
and two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
† Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-
weather road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and upazila headquarters. Higher score implies poor 
infrastructure.  
 
For another robustness check, we considered NGO density in the village, measured 
by per capita number of NGOs ((number of NGOs/number of households)*100), as 
the dependent variable. The results, presented in Table 6, are similar to those 
previously reported. The change in the results is that percentage of land irrigated 
using electricity is not significant. In addition to distance from the upazila 
headquarters and commercial bank, distance from all-weather road now becomes 
(negative and) significant.  
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Table 6. OLS regression - dependent variable: per capita number of NGOs 
in a village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
IRRIG 0.256 (0.96) 0.350 (1.30) 0.319 (1.25) 
CROP_1 -0.695 (-1.48) -0.547 (-1.28) -0.551 (-1.23) 
CROP_2 -0.112 (-0.30) -0.135 (-0.37) -0.136 (-0.41) 
CROP_3 0.123 (0.27) 0.120 (0.25) 0.258 (0.56) 
SHOP 1.391 (1.47) 0.966 (1.14) 0.930 (1.05) 
ELECT 0.210 (0.38) 0.161 (0.29) 0.126 (0.26) 
DTHAN -0.063** (-2.35)   
DBANK  -0.056** (-2.50)  
DBAZR 0.050 (1.09) 0.034 (0.75)  
DBUST 0.036 (1.63) 0.034 (1.56)  
DROAD -0.094** (-2.16) -0.080* (-1.80)  
VIBR†   -0.122* (-1.74) 
DHSCH 0.063 (1.08) 0.076 (1.28) 0.069 (1.33) 
R-square 0.191 0.179 0.148 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant 
and two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
† Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-
weather road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and upazila headquarters. Higher score implies poor 
infrastructure. 
 
The above results confirm the model predictions that NGO coverage decreases with 
distance and poor physical infrastructure, and increases with the opportunity for 
productive activities.28 Placing programme in remote and hard-to-reach villages 
increases the operating costs of an NGO, thus jeopardizing its cost-effectiveness. 
Rather, to ensure highest loan recovery, an NGO places its programme in the village 
where loans can be better utilized in productive activities. Incidence of poverty is not 
a consideration for an NGO to choose programme locations.29   
                                                 
28 There are similar findings at the macroeconomic level. Ahlin et al. (2010) find some strong relationship 
between macroeconomic conditions and microfinance program performance. For example, NGOs 
become more cost-effective when macroeconomic growth is higher. 
 
29 The results do not meaningfully change if standard errors are clustered at the upazila level. The minor 
changes are the following. In Table 2 (dependent variable is percentage of NGO member households), 
the coefficient of percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity is not robustly significant 
across specifications. On the other hand, in Table 6 (dependent variable is NGO density), the negative 
coefficient of percentage of land growing one-crop a year becomes robustly significant across 
specifications.  
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An alternative interpretation of the results 
 
It has now been established that NGOs, at least in Bangladesh, have deliberately 
excluded the extreme poor because they are considered as risky clients, and the 
operating costs of serving them are also high because they usually borrow a smaller 
amount. Some extreme poor also self-select themselves not to borrow because they 
perceive that they will not be able to generate a flow of income necessary to repay 
the loan (Amin, et al. 2003, Hashemi 2001, Matin 2005). We have provided evidence 
that distance from the upazila headquarters is associated with higher incidence of 
poverty (Fig. 2-4). Therefore, the borrowers’ (producers’) distribution in terms of 
distance can alternatively be interpreted in terms of poverty incidence; borrowers 
become poorer as one moves along the unit line. An NGO incurs higher operating 
costs for serving poorer borrowers away from point 0 on the unit line as they borrow 
a smaller amount (hence, they produce smaller quantity). Only the borrowers up to 
the cut-off level of poverty *fd  will be able to produce sufficient goods to sell in the 
market after incurring transaction costs. Therefore, only these borrowers will borrow 
from the NGO because they can repay the loan. However, motivated by its 
humanitarian objective (or due to imperfect information), the NGO also wants to lend 
to the poorer in the * *[ ,  ]f Nd d  interval. But these producers will be unwilling to 
borrow since they cannot sell their goods and consequently default on the loan. The 
borrowers locating in the *[1 ,  1]Nd−  poverty interval will always be excluded by the 
NGO.  This is an alternative explanation of why NGOs deliberately exclude some 
extreme poor and why some extreme poor also self-select themselves out of the 
microfinance programme. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper develops a simple model of choosing programme location by an NGO. An 
NGO, even with its humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation, will limit the 
microfinance programme to locations where operating costs are low and productive 
opportunities are ample, so that it can attain cost-effectiveness. Empirical results 
using data from three northern districts of Bangladesh strongly support the model 
predictions. NGO coverage, measured both by percentage of NGO member 
households and number of NGOs operating in a village, decreases with distance 
from the main marketplace in the region and poor physical infrastructure. On the 
other hand, NGO coverage is higher in the villages where higher percentage of 
agricultural land is irrigated using electricity. The model and empirical results also 
explain why NGOs deliberately exclude some extreme poor and why some extreme 
poor self-select not to participate in the microfinance programme. 
 
The results have important implications for policy analysis as well as for research on 
impact evaluation of the microfinance programme. The microfinance programme was 
devised to mitigate credit market imperfections. However, rural output market is also 
highly imperfect due to poor physical infrastructure and lack of marketing facilities, 
which impedes proper functioning of the microfinance programme. This shows that 
imperfections in credit market cannot be mitigated in the presence of imperfections 
in output market.  
 
NGOs do not invest in infrastructure development but their mission of poverty 
alleviation depends, to a great extent, on the existing infrastructure. This justifies the 
government intervention in infrastructure development. Since NGOs choose locations 
purposively rather than randomly, research investigating the impact of the 
microfinance programme must take into account village level selection bias in 
addition to selection bias at the participant level.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
List of NGOs  
 
The NGOs are CARE, Grameen Bank, Proshika, ASA, BRAC, Nijera Kori, RDRS, Alor 
Pothe, PIP, Chhinnomul, Gram Unnayan Kendra, Palli Unnayan Kendra, Swanirvar 
Bangladesh, Grameen Krishi Foundation, Krishi Foundation, Academy, Apon Udjog, 
Heed Bangladesh, Thengamara, RDI, Shishu Kalyan, Samaj Unnoyon Sangho, 
Samokal, Caritas, CCDB, ECDP, BAHED, IDS, Plan, CDC, Udoyan, RESA, Padatik, 
RDS, Solidarity, RISED, Mishuk, Gram Bikash, BISIC, ASOD, Bandhan, Setu, 
Rescue, Come-to-work, PPS, NBRDS, Islami Relief, Pusti,  BRDB, ANSAR-VDP, 
Jubo Unnoyan, Palli Daridro Bimochon Karmashuchi, LGD, Bangladesh Agricultural 
Bank, Government Fisheries, IRDB, Social Welfare, and RD9.  
 
Most of the NGOs listed above are involved in microfinance activities. Some 
government organizations are also involved in microfinance and other development 
activities (such as BRDB, Bangladesh Agricultural Bank, ANSAR-VDP). We treat all of 
them as NGO.  
 
The large NGOs are Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, Proshika, BRDB, RDRS, and 
Thengamara Mahila Sabuj Sangha. The last two are large regional NGOs working 
only in the northern Bangladesh. Only BRDB is government organization.  Grameen 
Bank is a commercial bank lending only to the poor. Microfinance is the only/main 
activity of all these large NGOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
